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Corporate Social Responsibility:
European Models
By GUNTER H. ROTH*
with contributions to chapters II, V and VIZ
By HANNS FITz**
I. Introduction
"A big corporation shouldn't destroy a building that has meant so
much to so many for so long."' Few if any European advocates of
corporate social responsibility have been as eloquent as Jacqueline
Kennedy Onassis and Joan Mondale in their efforts to block the Penn
Central Railroad's plans to demolish New York's Grand Central
Building. By and large, however, the questions arising in the area of
corporate social responsibility are similar on both sides of the Atlantic:
Should a large corporation raise prices in a manner detrimental to na-
tional economic policy, maintain close ties to so-called imperialist
countries, construct or operate nuclear power plants, or pursue other
projects potentially dangerous to the environment? These three or four
questions not only illustrate the current European perception of the
subject of corporate social responsibility, but also define some of the
problems facing those who wish to implement such a system of social
responsibility.
Corporate social responsibility may be broadly defined as the duty
of an enterprise to consider in a general way the public interest. The
ultimate goal of corporate social responsibility is to establish among
corporate decision-makers an entrepreneurial behavior solicitous of the
public interest even when such behavior also proves detrimental to spe-
* Professor of Commercial and Corporation Law, University of Innsbruck, Austria.
Dr. jur., University of Wiirzburg, Germany, 1967; Professor of Law, University of
Hamburg, 1974; Visiting Professor, University of North Carolina, 1973; Judge at the Appel-
late Court of Hamburg, 1975.
** Assistant Professor, University of Innsbruck; Dr. iur., University of Salzburg, Aus-
tria, 1973.
1. NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1978, at 25.
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cific business interests such as profit maximization. This en-
trepreneurial behavior cannot be defined, however, in terms of specific
legal commands and interdictions. Instead, in attempting to define this
behavior, we find ourselves in a "gray zone" between voluntary benev-
olence, strictly moral obligations, and sweeping legal duties. This am-
bivalence naturally results from the fact that corporate social
responsibility is, in the final analysis, basically concerned with nothing
else but the general concept of "good citizenship" as addressed specifi-
cally to the large corporate enterprise. The legal system is, therefore,
confronted with the difficult task of turning this general corporate obli-
gation of good citizenship into a legal requirement meaningful and ef-
fective in any given instance.2
Although corporate social responsibility may be loosely identified
with corporate good citizenship, the notion of good citizenship never-
theless acquires quite a new dimension when a large corporation is in-
volved. The actions of a large corporation inevitably affect the public
interest to a much greater extent than in cases where only an individual
citizen is involved. Consequently, in any ensuing conflict between the
corporation's own commercial interests and the general public welfare,
the stakes are much higher than when a private individual's interests
conflict with the public interest. The large enterprise's powerful and
potentially destructive impact on the public interest, therefore, natu-
rally singles it out as the addressee of corporate social responsibility.
With the large enterprise, private power is transformed into public
power; the enterprise itself is transformed into a public institution. The
quantitative difference between the individual citizen and the big enter-
prise develops into a qualitative distinction. 3 To this public power pub-
lic responsibility must correspond. The theory of corporate social
responsibility, however, applies equally well to any enterprise, irrespec-
tive of size, whose actions may have a significant economic impact on
the public at large or to any corporation that may potentially dominate
the market. The sheer size of its sales and profit figures may also play a
2. In contrast, the adoption of express legal provisions which specifically define cer-
tain conduct as illegal-for example, zoning and environmental laws-is not a problem of
corporate social responsibility in the narrow sense of the term. The large corporation owes
obedience to such prohibitions no less than any other citizen. In a larger sense, however,
one may consider the comparatively modest task of making corporations law-abiding as a
first step towards greater corporate social responsibility in the same manner that civic obedi-
ence to the law is considered a prerequisite to good citizenship.
3. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS
AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973); H. MERTENS, C. KIRCHNER & E. SCHANZE, WIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT 106 & passim (1978); C. OTr, RECHTUND REALITAT DER UNTERNEHMEN-
SKORPORATION (1977).
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role in that it makes financial sacrifices for the public interest appear
more tolerable.
None of these criteria-the enterprise's size and significant eco-
nomic power, its control of the market, or the size of its profits-is nec-
essarily limited to the corporate form of enterprise organization.
4
However, enterprises that have one or more of these attributes are typi-
cally organized as corporations. In addition, the internal structure of
the corporation which generally consists of the separation of ownership.
and control seems to create a particularly unfavorable climate for vol-
untary good citizenship5 and hence the need for some theory or rule of
social responsibility to govern its actions.6
This Article will examine the various modes proposed and/or
adopted in Europe for imposing upon corporations a sense of responsi-
bility for the public welfare. The Article will conclude that the most
promising means for achieving this goal is to bestow upon independent
trustees the power to manage the enterprise and to impose upon the
4. In most European countries alternative forms of enterprise organization are of
greater importance than in the United States, in particular the "limited company," unknown
in the United States and somewhat comparable, under a functional perspective, to the close
corporation.
5. The impediments to voluntary good citizenship resulting from the corporate struc-
ture can be found, in terms of behavioral analysis, in a certain weakness of motivation. The
peculiar distribution of power and responsibility within the corporate structure contributes
to eliminating some essential motivations for voluntary respect of the public interest. The
diversification of responsibility engendered by the two-tier or three-tier power structure, for
example, impairs the development within one person or group of both a sense of responsibil-
ity to the public in general, as well as a bad conscience for any action or decision detrimental
to the public welfare. This makes it easy for management to exonerate itself from its social
responsibility by referring to an obedience to its shareholders and for the shareholders, at
the same time, to disguise a boundless egoism (as distinguished from their legitimate interest
in profits) behind the veil of anonymity or to claim their utter helplessness vis-a-vis manage-
ment. See generally Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives From the
German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Vagts]; Roth, Supervision of Cor-
porate Management: the "Outside" Director and the German Experience, 51 N.C.L. REV.
1369 (1973).
6. The separation of ownership and control in the public corporation also makes a
strong argument in favor of bringing interests other than shareholder interests into the pic-
ture as well. See notes 66-85 & accompanying text infra. It is certainly not coincidental,
moreover, that the origins of the American corporate social responsibility doctrine, see
Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145-63 (1932);
Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable? 2
U. CHI. L. REV. 194-207 (1934), can be traced back to the discovery of the separation of
ownership and control phenomenon. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1968). See generally A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPI-
TALIST REVOLUTION (1954); A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959); Berle, Property,
Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1965); Berle, Corporate Decision-Making
and Social Control, 24 Bus. LAW. 149 (1968).
EUROPEAN MODELSMay 1979]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
corporation a system of social accounting that would provide the public
with meaningful information concerning the corporation's activities.
Such trustees would be under a duty to consider all inter-
ests-including the public interest-in all its decisions and such in-
creased public awareness would stimulate management to examine
more closely the public welfare in administering the enterprise.
The doctrine of corporate social responsibility has been recognized
to a different extent among the various European legal systems. Al-
though the doctrine has been expressed in different forms, two basic
approaches have been pursued. The external approach applies govern-
mental power or other mechanisms of external social control in order
to guarantee an entrepreneurial behavior that is solicitous of the public
welfare. Under this approach the government either establishes express
legal duties or creates other external motivations to realize the desired
behavior. German-Austrian law, for example, recognizes a general and
comprehensive responsibility of management to consider the public
welfare in discharging its corporate duties. The law also contains spe-
cific legal regulations imposing enforceable standards of conduct upon
corporate management and equips governmental agencies with certain
regulatory powers. The internal approach, on the other hand, provides
for a representation of public interests within the power structure of the
enterprise itself, thus enabling the public to influence directly the enter-
prise's decision-making process. In Germany and other parts of Eu-
rope, for example, employee codetermination is one example of the
internal approach. In addition, in several European countries the state
has extensive capital investments in large corporations allowing a direct
participation in the decisionmaking process.
II. Corporate Social Responsibility as a Duty of Management
General Legal Provisions
The most conspicuous expression of the doctrine of corporate so-
cial responsibility found in some European corporation laws is the ex-
press duty of management to consider the public interest in the
administration of the enterprise. The German Corporations Code of
1937, for example, required the Vorstand7 "to.direct the company in
accordance with the requirements of the enterprise and its working
7. The Vorstand is akin to the management board of the American corporation or to
the insider or officer members on the board of directors of the American corporation. See
generally authorities cited note 5 supra.
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force and the common welfare of the people and the empire."" Re-
gardless of its national-socialist phraseology, this statutory language ex-
presses a principle of corporate responsibility for the public welfare
that in substance corresponds to the ideas.developed for the American
public corporation 9 and that had been recognized in Germany well
before the dominance of national-socialist ideology.' 0 Although the
present German Corporations Code has eliminated this statutory lan-
guage, the principle as such is still accepted as valid by most
commentators. " I
In Austria, the duty of management as stated in the German code
of 1937 is still the law. Only the formulation has been modified. The
Vorstand is required to direct the company "for the benefit of the en-
terprise with regard to the interests of shareholders and employees as
well as to the public interest."' 2 The law, therefore, generally recog-
nizes the doctrine of corporate social responsibility in that it expressly
requires the management of the corporation to consider, in the admin-
istration of the enterprise, not only its shareholders' interests but other
interests as well, including the public interest. The only remaining
8. § 70(l) GERMAN CORP. CODE (AKTIENG.).
9. See authorities cited note 6 supra, But see W.O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FI-
NANCE (1940); P. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 203, 337 (1950); Donaldson, Financial
Goals: Management v. Stockholders, 41 HARV. Bus. REv. (No. 13) 116-29 (1963); Har-
brecht, The Modern Corporation Revisited, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1410-26 (1964); Rostow, To
"om and For Wat Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 46-71 (E.S. Mason ed. 1969).
10. K. GEILER, DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN STRUKTURWANDLUNGEN UND DIE REFORM
DES AKTIENRECHTS 2 (1927); J. KEYNES, DAS ENDE DES LAISSEZ-FAIRE (1926); W.
RATHENAU, VOM AKTIENWESEN (1917). See also G. ROTH, DAS TREUHANDMODELL DES
INVESTMENTRECHTS 201 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ROTH].
11. D. BAAS, LEITUNGSMACHT UND GEMEINWOHLBINDUNG DER AG (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as BAAS]; B. KROPFF, AKTIENGESETZ 97 (1965); J. LOOCK, ZUR VERANTWORTUNG
DES VORSTANDES DER AG NACH § 76 I (Diss. Hamburg 1977); K. RUMPFF, ZUR SCHUT-
ZRICHTUNG AKTIENRECHTLICHER VORSCHRIFTEN UND IHRE BEDEUTUNG FOR DIE VER-
ANTWORTLICHKEIT DES VORSTANDE 74-115 (1969); H. WORDINGER, AKTIEN- UND
KONZERNRECHT § 21(IV)(2)(b) (1966); KOLNER KOMMENTAR (H. J. MERTENS) § 76 AKTG
No. 5; J. Meyer-Landrut in GRO3KOMMENTAR 1/2 § 76 AKTG No. 9 (1973); W. Hefermehl
in E. GEIPLER, W. HEFERMEHL, U. ECKARDT, B. KROPFF, AKTIENGESETZ II § 76 AKTG No.
21 (1973/74) [hereinafter cited as HEFERMEHL]; R. VON GODmN-H. & S. WILHELM, AK-
TIENGESETZ I § 76 AKTG No. 5f (1971); ZUR VERANTWORTLICHKEIT DER AM UN-
TERNEHMENSLEBEN BETEILIGTEN INTERESSEN, Betr. 1971, 140-206. Some authors even
derive this general principle of corporate social responsibility directly from the constitution
(GRUNDEETZ art. 14(2): the so-called social commitment of property. W. HEFERMEHL,
supra; B. KROPFF, suipra; H. J. MERTENS, supra; see R. Reinhardt, Privates Unternehmen und
bffentlichesInteresse, FESTSCHRIFT A. HUECK 439-50 (1959); F. Rittner, Zur Verantwortung
des Vorstandes nach§ 76.4bs. 1 4ktG 1965, DIE AG 1973, 113-22; FESTSCHRIFT E. GEP3LER
139-58 (1971).
12. § 70(l) AUSTRIAN CORP. CODE (AKTIENG.).
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question is whether the formulations of this general managerial duty
such as the one found in the Austrian code, indicate a legal order of
precedence among the various interests to be considered by
management. 13
A general legal provision of this nature, however, is not self-exe-
cuting. What is needed to make this provision effective is some in-
dependent third party to judge management's behavior in light of this
general obligation and to impose sanctions for any violations of its ob-
ligations. For the several reasons examined below, however, this man-
ner of enforcement has not as yet been realized. Any attempt to distill
specific duties of management from its general obligation to consider
the public welfare necessarily meets with enormous difficulties. It
proves difficult, for example, to derive from this general obligation a
specific managerial duty to keep prices at a lower level, or to refrain
from reducing production in view of threatening unemployment, or to
ensure that all products are environmentally safe, or even to make
charitable contributions. 14 Commentators, therefore, interpret this gen-
eral corporate responsibility for the public welfare as nothing more
than a general authorization for management to weigh at its own dis-
cretion the conflicting interests of the enterprise, the shareholders, the
employees, the consumers, and the public at large. Presently, judicial
or agency review of management's exercise of this discretion is unavail-
able.I5 In short, there are no legal sanctions against management for
violation of its general social responsibility. Whereas the German Cor-
porations Code of 1937 provided for a compulsory dissolution of the
company on account of jeopardizing the public welfare,' 6 modem Ger-
man corporation law provides for dissolution in this area only when
such jeopardy to the public welfare is caused by specific unlawful con-
duct of management.17 The Austrian Corporations Code likewise does
not contain legal sanctions for management's violation of its general
duty of social responsibility.
13. When the statute of a European stock company (societas europea) was being
drafted as the supra-national corporation law for the European Common Market, see E.
STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS 424-82 (197 1), a proposed provision
holding corporate management generally responsible to the public was discussed. Art. 70
read as follows: "The members of the management board are bound to ...further the
welfare of the company and of its employees." The committee on economic and social mat-
ters had recommended the following supplement: "within the limits of the public interest."
The final text, however, does not contain any such provision.
14. But see D. BAAS, LEITUNGSMACHT UND GEMEINWOHLBINDUNG DER AG (1976).
15. HEFERMEHL, supra note 11.
16. § 288 CORP. CODE OF 1937.
17. § 396 CORP. CODE OF 1965.
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Detailed legal rules governing management's general social re-
sponsibility, moreover, are sometimes considered incompatible with a
free economic system. One commentator has argued that any such
governmental intrusion into management's discretionary power to
weigh the various commercial and public interests would deprive man-
agement of that freedom of decision, self-determination and ultimate
responsibility that is the cornerstone of any system of private enter-
prise, and would turn the enterprise into a public organ. 8 Such an
argument, however, although persuasive, fails to address the decisive
question whether the large corporation, because of its potentially enor-
mous impact on both the economy and society in general, should be
exempt from governmental interference. A second argument against
the promulgation of specific legal rules to govern management's gen-
eral obligation to consider the public welfare appears more convincing.
Corporate management would clearly be overtaxed were it required to
take into account in every detail the potential impact of its decisions on
the public interest and to weigh all the interests involved in such a com-
prehensive and qualitative manner as to withstand any subsequent ju-
dicial scrutiny of its decisions. 19 The difficulties with which even a
legislator is confronted in the comparable situation where he or she
must assess the myriad possible effects of a legislative measure are a
well-known subject of modern law and social science research.20 In-
deed, corporate management is even less qualified for this task and
normally cannot afford either the time-consuming diligence of a legis-
lator or his comprehensive sources of information and instruments of
social science research. As a consequence, one should not expect man-
18. HEFERMEHL, supra note 11.
19. H.-G. KOPPENSTEINER, INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMEN IM DEUTSCHEN GESELL-
SCHAFTSRECHT 211-15 (1971).
20. 2 N. LUHMANN, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 309-15 (1972); P. NOLL, GESETZGEBUNG-
SLEHRE 54-58 (1973). An excellent example of the multiple and, possibly, contradictory con-
sequences of a rise in automobile prices is given in H. MERTENS, C. KIRCHNER & E.
SCHANZE, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 120 (1978): (1) A price increase by the leading auto manu-
facturer stimulates inflation. (2) The price increase entails higher state revenues from cor-
porate income tax and from state stockholdings in the corporation. (3) The distributive
aspect: the many small shareholders of the corporation receive adequate dividends for their
investment, which is desirable under a social perspective. (4) Higher profits of the corpora-
tion are tantamount to a higher investment potential: money is channeled into investment
instead of consumption. (5) Investment will create jobs. (6) Investment will strengthen the
competitive position on the international markets. (7) Higher profits for this car manufac-
turer indirectly support the development of the (s. c. underdeveloped) region where its facto-
ries are located. (8) Making the automobiles more expensive reduces the sales figures and
thus means savings in energy. (9) and savings in road construction expenses as well. (10)
This contributes to higher unemployment, and so on.
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agement always to find the optimum compromise. All that can reason-
ably be expected is the exercise of its best efforts to the extent
commonly applied in business matters. To impose higher standards of
decision-making upon management might very well result in para-
lyzing its entrepreneurial activity, thereby impairing management's ec-
onomic efficiency to the detriment of every interest involved.
What remains, as a practical matter, of management's general duty
of social responsibility, as recognized in German and Austrian law, is
the authorization of management to subordinate in any given case
company and shareholder interests to the public interest, if it wants to.
When acting within certain very broad limits, therefore, management
need not fear legal action on the part of its shareholders for the exercise
of its discretion in this area.2' It must be emphasized, however, that
management is under no obligation to forego commercial and share-
holder interests in favor of the public interest. If it does not want to do
so in any particular case, it does not violate the law. 22
This result seems reasonable insofar as it leaves to management
the freedom to choose among the conflicting interests involved. But the
inevitable and unfortunate consequence of bestowing on management
this freedom is to grant to management the concommitant right to de-
cide in the first instance whether to consider the public interest at all.
Specific Legal Provisions
The enforcement of management's duty to consider the public in-
terest in administering the enterprise becomes less complicated-at
least from a legal standpoint-when specific legal provisions impose
direct obligations upon the enterprise. Then, when the enterprise fails
to observe these obligations voluntarily, the law can more easily com-
pel compliance. As a result of this apparently more simplified method
of enforcing an enterprise's duty to protect the public welfare, a ten-
dency has developed to protect the public interests increasingly by
means of specific statutory laws that leave management little if any dis-
cretionary leeway. Examples of this include provisions of environmen-
tal, industrial safety, and consumer protection laws. Whereas, these
statutes are not aimed exclusively at the large corporation, many of
21. Dissatisfied shareholders, of course, may always register their dissatisfaction with
management's decision by exercise of their corporate voting rights. Management's action,
however, does not violate the law.
22. BAAs, supra note 11; HEFERMEHL, supra note 11; and S.H. Westermann, Die Ver-
antwortung des Vorstandes der AG, FESTSCHRiFT H. VITs 251 (1965) obviously do not see
the connection.
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these provisions as a practical matter affect mainly the big enterprise.23
Specific legal provisions, like the general corporate obligation dis-
cussed above, also present problems of law enforcement.24 At least in
Germany, big business by and large complies with specific legal provi-
sions. In the field of environmental law, for example, large corpora-
tions generally have the best record in meeting the standards imposed
upon th6m.25 It is certainly much easier, moreover, to enforce these
specific legal obligations than to compel compliance with the general
duties mentioned above. In particular, government supervision can be
applied more effectively with specific legal provisions.2 6
Several more important impediments to enforcing corporate social
responsibility by means of specific legal provisions exist. In many ar-
eas, for example, it is simply impossible, because of the nature of the
problems involved, to define the legal requirements in universally ap-
plicable standards. In other areas, such standards cannot be tailored
adequately to the specific capacity of a big corporation. In some im-
portant cases, finally, the legislative bodies themselves cannot settle on
an appropriate standard in conflict of interest situations.2 7
III. Indirect Nonlegal Sanctions
Public Opinion
Although it is often impossible to define and enforce manage-
ment's duty to the public welfare by means of specific legal provisions,
public opinion, particularly that articulated by the mass media, may
nevertheless achieve this goal. In contrast to the judicial system, public
opinion need not justify its specific demands upon corporate manage-
ment by reference to any code of law nor need its sanctions satisfy the
principles of constitutional law. Social control through public opinion
can have an impact even upon a discretionary power of management,
the exercise of which is not amenable to judicial control. If such social
control is effective, management must consider in all cases, prior to ex-
23. Most antipollution laws, for example, have little relevance to the ordinary citizen.
24. But see G. ROTH, EFFEKTmTATSPROBLEME IM UMWELTSCHUTZ, FESTSCHRIFT V.
D. HEYDTE 1143 (1977).
25. Of course, the possibility that the large enterprise is more skillful in concealing its
violations cannot be overlooked.
26. One possible exception to this observation is the multinational enterprise where the
effectiveness of governmental authority generally poses much more of a problem. But see
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 1978, at 4; GAHLER HARDEs, RAHMEYER & SCHMID, VOLKSWIRT-
SCHAFTSLEHRE 392 (1976).
27. H. MERTENS, C. KIRCHNER & E. SCHANZE, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 169 (1978).
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ercising its discretionary power, the myriad possible reactions of the
public to its ultimate decision.
One cannot usually expect, however, that public pressure will arise
spontaneously. Without joining the cynic who regards any expression
of public opinion as manipulated, one must recognize that some kind
of activism by organized groups is often essential. In Europe, however,
at least in the field of corporate social responsibility, such mechanisms
are rather exceptional. Powerful established organizations of common
interest may occasionally succeed in influencing the management of
corporations whose activities directly affect this interest. The German
automobile associations, for example, have successfully pressed their
demands for safer cars and better warranty conditions. But such orga-
nizations are relatively rare.
More direct in their approach, though not necessarily more effec-
tive in their results, are certain militant organizations devoted to open
warfare against entrepreneurial policies allegedly detrimental to the
public weal. In Europe, however, this approach until now has essen-
tially been confined to environmental causes such as actions against
nuclear power plants. 28 In the field of consumer protection most Euro-
pean nations have not yet proceeded as far as the United States al-
though in some countries consumerism is gaining momentum and
comparative testing of products is becoming increasingly important.29
Social Accounting
Publicity concerning the corporation's activities, however, does not
arise simply from the ranks of disgruntled consumers or shareholders.
Motivated by a desire to procure public acclaim for its allegedly re-
sponsible conduct, management likewise tries to mobilize public opin-
ion on its own. A remarkable development in this area in recent years
has been the emergence of social accounting. In connection with the
annual statement of accounts, 30 some European corporations, 3' pursu-
28. This example illustrates, however, the fine line between organized action to enforce
corporate social responsibility and political opposition. A particularly interesting activity
pursued by some of these organizations-here clinging to the Ralph Nader model-is to
make their views heard at shareholder meetings. Although mobilizing public opinion is
probably the main purpose of these activities, they nonetheless qualify, at least in form, if
not in substance, as intra-corporate shareholder activities. The role of shareholders in en-
forcing corporate social responsibility is discussed at notes 40-51 & accompanying text infra.
29. In Germany, for example, comparative testing of products is conducted by an in-
dependent institution, the Warentest foundation.
30. § 148 GERMAN AKTIENG.: annual balance sheet and income statement.
31. In Germany the first company to do so was STEAG in 1973, and later on BASF,
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ant to the American model of social accounting, publish a "balance
sheet" of the profits the public has derived from the corporation. In
practice, this usually entails a statement of the corporate expenditures
for public and social purposes. Management uses social accounting for
two basic reasons: to impress the general public and the political deci-
sion-makers with a detailed list of the enterprise's contributions to the
public welfare (thereby preventing legislative or administrative meas-
ures disadvantageous to the corporation) and to earn the respect of its
employees and their representatives so as to prevent excessive labor
demands.
In its most elaborate form, the social account is presented as a re-
formulation of the annual profit and loss statement with corporate ex-
penditures such as operating costs, expenses, wages, and dividend
payments arranged according to the various persons or beneficiaries
who receive the benefit of these expenditures. 32 Current practice favors
a division of beneficiaries as follows: capital, the working force, the
community, and the enterprise. Such expenditures as tax payments,
charitable contributions, costs of environmental protection, and infor-
mation to the public are allocated to the community; expenses for sala-
ries, social security, pension funds, and intramural sporting activities
are assigned to the working force. To the capital account is assigned
corporate expenditures for dividend payments and interest payments
on outstanding loans. Finally, expenses for depreciation and research
are allocated to the corporation. 33
Following is a sample social accounting sheet based on the 1977
SHELL, and BP. See Empfehlungen des Arbeitskreises "Sozialbilanz-Praxis" DB 1141
(1978).
32. One basic difference of opinion is whether the statement ought to be drafted as an
"account of benefit" comprising the costs and expenses in total, or as an "account of value
created" only, with input from external sources (such as canteen meals purchased from
outside) deducted. See p. e. Deutsch Shell AG, Geschiftsbericht/sozialbilanz 1977, S 12.
55, 59-67.
33. German literature on social accounting: K. BROCKHOFF, GESELLSCHAFT-
SBEZOGENE BERICHTERSTATTUNG DER UNTERNEHMEN, ZfbF 1975, 39-47; K. BROCKHOFF,
ZUR EXTERNEN GESELLSCHAFTSBEZOGENEN BERICHTERSTATTUNG DEUTSCHER UN-
TERNEHMEN (1975); M. DIERKES, DIE SOZIALBILANZ (1974); P. EICHHORN, GESELLSCHAFT-
SBEZOGENE UNTERNEHMENSRECHNUNG (1974); P. EICHHORN, GRUNDLAGEN EINER
GEMEINWIRTSCHAFTLICHEN ERFOLGSRECHNUNG FOR UNTERNEHMEN (1974); A. HEIGL,
KONZEPTE BETRIBLICHER UMWELTRECHNUNGSLEGUNG, DB 1974, 2265-70; G. LOCHER-
BACH, DIE "SOZIALBILANZ" ALS INFORMATIONS-UND RECHENSCHAFTS LEGUNGSINSTRU-
MENT DES UNTERNEHMENS, BETRIEBSWRITSCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNG UND PRAXIS 1975,
53-58; G. LOCHERBACH, DIE SOZIALBILANZ, BBG 1975, 401-06; MINTROP, GESELLSCHAFT-
SBEZOGENE RECHENSCHAFT-SLEGUNG (Diss. Zurich o. D.); H. WEDELL, DIE WERT-
SCHOPFUNG ALS MEO3GRO43E FOR DIE LEISTUNGSKRAFr EINES UNTERNEHMENS, DB 1976,
205-13; WEIHE, CORPORATE SOCIAL ACCOUNTING, DIE UNTERNEHMUNG 1975, 219-30; F.
EUROPEAN MODELSMay 1979]
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statement of the German Shell Corporation. For our purposes, the
statement has been greatly simplified.
Sample social accounting sheet
Distribution (in
Mill. DM) of
"benefit"
(total amount
of expenses)Beneficiaries value added
I. Working force
-wages and salaries
-- special allocations and benefits
-insurance and pension premiums
-- expenses for continuing education,
information, canteen, health, industrial
safety, sport, and factory committee.
II. Community
-taxes
-charitable and other contributions
-information
-environmental protection (investments) 3 4
-research 3
5
-royalties
III. Capital
-dividend
-interest for outside capital (loans)
IV. Enterprise
-reserve fund (to meet future losses or
liabilities)
-Aepreciation
-research
10 3
388 376
47 47
6
4
61
(-)
70 -
188 47
(-) (-)
48 48
48 48
11 -
207 -34
831 Mill. 437 Mill.
The first problem in the context of social accounting is the alloca-
tion and valuation of the different income items. No obligatory guide-
lines exist, and management is free, for example, to claim as a social
service expenses for the continuing professional education of its em-
ployees even though such expenses were incurred in the very interest of
Dribbusch, Die Erfassung und der Ausweis des sozialen Verhaltens in DER SOCIALBILANZ (am
Beispiel der BASF), RdA 1978, 103-08.
34. An example for lack of consistency: investments-depreciations.
35. An example of a doubtful classification:- sub IV (thus the SHELL AG) or sub II
(thus the BASF AG).
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the enterprise itself.36 Nevertheless some check on management's allo-
cation and valuation of expenditures can be expected from the very
public opinion management seeks to impress, for a social account must
be somewhat plausible in order to yield the desired effect. Whenever
social accounting is used for competitive purposes, moreover, the law
against unfair competition might offer an even more effective instru-
ment of control for intentional misrepresentation.
A more aggravationg problem with social accounting is that some
of the more important aspects of corporate social responsibility cannot
be adequately represented in the form of accounting data. The results
of a restrained pricing policy pursued in the public interest, for exam-
ple, is not easily reflected on the social accounting sheet. Even more
difficult is a realistic appraisal of the social input into the enterprise.
How does one assess the various social values consumed by the enter-
prise without adequate consideration such as the strains its activities
place on the environment? The social accounting system currently
used completely ignores this side of corporate operations. 37
In spite of all its weaknesses social accounting remains a rather
promising method for monitoring corporate social responsibility. It
may also prove to stimulate management to examine more closely the
public welfare in administering the enterprise. In order to achieve
these goals, however, more and more corporations must publish social
accounting statements, and the statements themselves must be im-
proved and standardized so as to guarantee more substantial and accu-
rate information. The time has probably not yet come, however, for
making such statements mandatory by law.38 Any such statutory re-
quirement, if adopted prematurely, might only prove to impair unnec-
essarily the further refinement of social accounting. Instead, a greater
use of social accounts may be achieved by means of a more gentle pres-
sure exercised by the model-behavior of a few corporations. As more
corporations prepare social accounts and thereby establish for them-
36. S. Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 20./21.5.1978, at 33. This is the reason for the negative
attitude of the trade unions towards social accounting. But see DER SPIEGEL, 21.8.1978 (Nr.
32) 82; ARBEIT LIND WIRTSCHAFT 7/8 1977, at 46-48.
37. In all fairness, however, it should be noted that an informative statement of such
items is hardly conceivable in the present stage of social accounting practice.
38. In France, an annual statement of social accounts will be mandatory for all large
corporations beginning in 1979 and will be regulated in detail by statute. The French law,
however, quite clearly emphasizes employee interests and appears rather to be more an in-
strument of labor law than a system to gauge corporate social responsibility. Law of July 12,
1977, [1977] J.O. But see KAPP-PETITGUYOT, LE BILAN SOCIAL, SON APPLICATION LEGALE
(1978).
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selves a positive public image, still other corporations will feel com-
pelled to join the bandwagon. The role of jurisprudence and
economics should be limited to making general recommendations for
improving the methods of social accounting.39
IV. Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Powers
Public interest shareholder proposals
The common perception of the corporation as a balance of at least
two powers-management and capital owners-raises the question
whether stockholders should also bear their share of corporate social
responsibility in the exercise of their stockholder rights. The instru-
ment most effective in serving the public interest is the shareholder's
voting rights; the derivative suit is all but unknown in continental Eu-
rope as a remedy against managerial neglect of duties. Indeed, in re-
cent years several cases of shareholder activities on behalf of the public
interest in the annual meetings of large corporations made quite a stir
in Germany. The main subjects at these meetings were the allegedly
"imperialistic" policies of the corporation-participation, for example,
in the construction of the Cabora Bassa dam in then Portuguese
Mozambique-and the construction and operation of environmentally
hazardous facilities such as nuclear power plants.4°
From a legal standpoint, however, such shareholder initiatives are
not proper shareholder proposals but merely critical responses to the
performance of management or, at best, proposals regarding the elec-
tion of directors or members of the supervisory board. The law clearly
states that matters relating to the conduct of the ordinary business oper-
ations of the corporation do not come within the competence of the
shareholders unless management-the Vorstand4 1-- expressly allows
the shareholders to decide such matters. In matters of the kind men-
39. Presently the most informative form of social accounting is an account of distribu-
tion recording all the expenses and allowances made by the enterprise, including gratuitous
services which, because of their lack of consideration, are not reflected in the income state-
ment (e.g., an automobile manufacturer supplies the Red Cross with ambulance cars at a
preferential price), and including as well allowances for extraneous production which, ac-
cording to the present practice, are not counted as values created by the enterprise (e.g., sale
of goods bought from third parties to the employees at a lower price or even free of charge).
40. See the following press reports of 1972, the year when the movement first gained
wide-spread publicity: 55 HANDELSBLATT 28; 56 HANDELSBLATT 5; 104 HANDELSBLATT 13;
130 HANDELSBLATT 5; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 23, 1972, at 13; Blick durch die
Wirtschaft, May 5, 1972, at 5; Blick durch die Wirtschaft, May 3, 1972, at 5; Blick durch die
Wirtschaft, May 25, 1972, at 3; Die AG 1972, 223. See also P. FORSTMOSER, DER AK-
TIONAR ALS FORDERER DES GEMEINWOHLS, ZSR 1973, 1-25.
41. § 119(2) GERMAN AKTIENG; § 103(2) AUSTRIAN AKTIENG.
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tioned above, however, management normally has a very clear opinion
of its own, and would rarely ask for a shareholder decision on these
matters. One should expect, therefore, the same question to arise under
German law which has become so important in the United States,42 viz.
should shareholder proposals that consist simply of a recommendation
be admissible at shareholder meetings when the proposal concerns a
matter not the proper subject for action by stockholders? Strangely
enough, this problem has not yet met with any attention in Germany.
Even if such recommendations were admitted, however, share-
holder proposals would fail because of a second obstacle: the legal reg-
ulation of voting at shareholder meetings43 which makes it all but
impossible for a shareholder to submit a proposal concerning corporate
social responsibility matters. The law states that shareholders can vote
only on those matters set forth in the agenda. 4 Except for certain
mandatory topics not relevant here, the agenda is determined by the
Vorstand.4 5 Although the law confers certain minority rights on the
shareholders, they are practically useless for our purposes here because
of the quorum requirements and other formalities.46 The individual
shareholder can, therefore, express his or her opinion only within the
agenda. The agenda, to be sure, may offer the shareholder some oppor-
tunity to discuss the annual report including the shareholder's right of
information,47 to give his or her general approval of the performance of
the Vorstand and Aufsichtsra4 48 but no opportunity is available to the
shareholders49 to vote on the very subject matter with which he or she
is most concerned. 50
Shareholders in a public corporation, therefore, cannot achieve by
means of public interest shareholder activities a corporate policy re-
sponsive to the public interest-not even if a majority of the stockhold-
ers were willing to do so.5' In the final analysis, public-interest
42. See 1934 Securities Exchange Act rule 14a-8.
43. The one power related to the ordinary business operations of the corporation which
is indeed conferred upon the shareholders-delimiting the scope of the enterprise by charter
amendment-is likewise limited by this regulation.
44. § 124(4) GERMAN AKTIENG.
45. §§ 121, 124(1) GERMAN AKTIENG.
46. §§ 122(2)-(3), 124(1), 123(1) GERMAN AKTiENG.
47. § 132 GERMAN AKTIENG.
48. § 120 GERMAN AKTIENG.
49. The management board is not elected by the shareholders. For details see Vagts,
supra note 5.
50. But see M. LUTrER, DER AKTIONAR IN DER MARKTWIRTSCHAFT 40 (1974); G.H.
Roth, DNotZ 1975, 380.
51. Getting such a majority vote would be practically impossible anyway. When pub-
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shareholder activities serve only to create publicity and thus to stir up
public opinion.
Shareholder Voting Rights vs. Fiduciary Duties of Management
The preceding discussion illustrates the minor role that stockhold-
ers actually play in the administration and management of the public
corporation. Indeed, the ineffectiveness of shareholder voting rights
has been labeled a "travesty of corporate democracy. '52 Abolishing
these voting rights, as suggested by Bayless Manning53 in the United
States and by myself in Germany, 54 might not only create a more rea-
sonable and realistic foundation for the shareholder-management rela-
tionship but also provide for a more socially responsible management.
This conclusion is based on the premise that a direct correlation exists
between the fiduciary duty and the power and independence of the
fiduciary, a premise clearly recognized in American trust law: "The
greater the independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary, the
greater the scope of his fiduciary duty." 55 Recognizing as a matter of
law that management, in administering the public corporation, oper-
ates independently of the shareholders, one is free to submit manage-
ment to the higher standard of responsibilities of a trustee.5 6 As long as
corporate management is perceived as subject to the "ultimate con-
trol" 57 of the shareholders, moreover, management's fiduciary duties
will likewise be seen as restricted almost exclusively to a concern for
shareholder interests alone. Only with the abolition of this theory will
management's fiduciary duties be expanded to include a concern for
lic interest activities are related to subjects on which the shareholders have the right to
vote-the discharge of board members or the election of supervisory board members-the
returns are usually 99 to 99.98% in favor of the management proposals. Seegenerally ROTH,
supra note 10, at 186; Roth, Die Herrschaft der Aktionare in der Publikums-AG, in FEST-
SCHRIFT PAULICK 81-100, at 90 (1973). The same result is found in American corporations.
See the results of "Campaign GM" as reported by Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Con-
test.- Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 430 (1971) (2.73 and 2.44% in
favor of public interest proposals).
52. See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1485-90 (1958).
53. Id. at 1490.
54. ROTH, supra note 10, at 206-30.
55. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949). See also May-
field v. First Nat'l Bank of Chattanooga, 137 F.2d 1013, 1019 (1943); and, in a similar sense,
the earlier case of Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 590 (1876). See also Bate, The
New Jersey Corporation: a Fiduciary Relationship, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 671, 679 (1969);
Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1931).
56. ROTH, supra note 10, at 226-29.
57. Sommer, Who's "In Control", 21 Bus. LAw. 559, 567 (1966).
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general social interests as well.58 Then management could no longer
exonerate itself from its social responsibilities simply by referring to its
"deliverance" to shareholder control.
It should be emphasized in this context that no infringement upon
legitimate shareholder interests is intended. However, no corporate so-
cial responsibility theory can exist without recognizing that the share-
holder is not the sole beneficiary of the enterprise's activities and that a
fair balance of interests-shareholder, employee, the general pub-
lic-must be achieved.
The problem then is not how to define this admittedly delicate bal-
ance in theory59 but how to organize power and control within the cor-
poration so as to serve these various, and often conflicting, interests
most effectively. The most promising method to achieve this result is to
entrust to a trustee the task of finding a fair balance between these con-
flicting interests. The sole prerequisite to such a system is that the
trustee be personally disinterested. Here, it is true, one may meet with
difficulties, for it is widely accepted that management largely identifies
itself with certain enterprise interests such as economic growth, increas-
ing power, and maximization of profits, 60 the very interests that will
most often collide with the public interest.
In order to resolve this conflict of interest, therefore, some disinter-
ested third party is needed to supervise management. This felt need is
probably the motivation for the current American trend towards inclu-
sion of public-interest directors on the board, or establishment of pub-
lic-interest committees. In Germany, one may also occasionally find a
personality from outside the business community, not directly affiliated
with shareholder or other specific interests, sitting on the supervisory
boards of 'corporations. Effective control of the conflict of interest
problem, however, requires more that just some ornamental enrich-
ment of the board; instead, a supervisory authority independent from,
and superior to, management must be established. This supervisory
system should, on the one hand, be organized on a supracorporate level
so as to avoid the danger of succumbing to the "gravitational attraction
of management ' 6 and, on the other hand, be integrated into the power
structure of the individual corporation in order to nurture that informal
and close working relationship between management and supervision
58. ROTH, supra note 10, at 306-08.
59. See notes 7-33 & accompanying text supra.
60. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 173-78 (1969).
61. European experience amply demonstrates that any intra-corporate supervision may
easily succumb to the dictates of management. Vagts, supra note 5, at 61.
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that is necessary for an effective control not detrimental to effective
management. What is needed, therefore, is a system of public control
over private enterprise organized on a governmental basis and exer-
cised by independent personalities assigned to the individual enter-
prise.62 Even under such a system, however, the question remains
unanswered as to what additional powers beyond the right to informa-
tion and the corresponding privilege of consulting and arguing with
management should be bestowed upon the supervisory body.
In a rudimentary form, a supervisory system similar to the one
outlined above has been realized in the Dutch corporation law of 1971.
Under Dutch law, the supervisory board is no longer elected by the
shareholders but is granted the right of co-optation. In addition, a so-
cial-economic council-Sociaal Economische Raad-has been insti-
tuted on a quasi-governmental level which insures that membership on
boards of the different corporations is properly balanced and that the
board members are properly qualified. In the social-economic council
itself the public, the employer, and the employee interests are equally
represented. 63 The Dutch model has been incorporated into the EEC
directive for the coordination of the European corporation laws64 and
may, therefore, have a great impact on the future development of Euro-
pean corporation law.65
V. Intracorporate Participation of the Social Factor
Employee Codetermination
In contrast to the disinterested, impartial trusteeship suggested
above, the preferred method in Europe today for accommodating the
various capital, employee, and public interests concerned with the ad-
ministration of the corporate enterprise is the equal participation by all
such interests in the corporate decision-making process. Under such a
system, at least in theory, all the different interests, including the public
62. For a more detailed analysis of this proposed system, see ROTH, supra note 10, at
320-22.
63. WETBOCK VAN KOOPHANDEL Art. 52. See I. LILL, DAS NIEDERLANDISCHE GESETZ
OBER DIE GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG UND UBER DIE STRUKTUR DER
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN RABELS Z 36 (1972) 161-79; Roth, Das neue niederidndische Ak-
tienrecht. Absage an die "Unternehmensdemokratid', AWD BB 1974, 312-15; Sanders, Re-
form des Gesellschaftsrechtes in den Niederlanden, DIE AG 1971, 389-96.
64. 5th Coordination Directive of Oct. 9, 1972, Commission of the European Commu-
nity, art. 4 III.
65. Niessen, Zum Vorschlag einer "europdischen" Regelung zur Mitbestimmungfui "na-
tionale" Akiiengeselschaften, ZGR 1973, 218-26 (text of the directive is at p. 226).
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interest, are represented and integrated within the corporate power
structure. Each is given a voice-and a vote-in corporate matters.
The most important development in this area has been the emer-
gence of a system of employee codetermination. Although some-argue
that under a system of employee codetermination, the public interest is
not represented in a comprehensive way, others maintain that em-
ployee codetermination takes care not only of specific employee inter-
ests but of the public welfare as well. The German statute governing
the mining and steel industry, for example, indirectly holds the em-
ployee representatives responsible for the public welfare as well.66 But,
all commentators generally agree that consideration of public needs is
at best simply a byproduct of the representatives' activities on behalf of
employees and can be expected only when the public interest coincides
with employee-trade union interests. 67 Such an identity of interests,
however, never arises in several important situations such as when cor-
porate proposals promise to increase the availability of employment
while, at the same time, threaten to destroy the environment. 68 As yet,
moreover, no European nation has established a system of corporate
management wherein representatives of the public interest represent a
"third power" on the board of the corporation, operating on an equal
footing with representatives of the shareholders and employees. Sug-
gestions to this effect, however, have been part-of the legal and political
discussion for decades.
A system of employee codetermination is most fully developed in
Germany where employee representatives are given a position on the
Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board). Since 197669 the German system has
been all but equal with shareholders and employees electing 50% of the
Aufsichtsrat members respectively. The chairman of the board, how-
ever, is generally a shareholder delegate to whom is given the decisive
vote in case of a tied vote. In the German mining and steel industry
total parity on the supervisory board had been granted by statute as
early as 1951; in addition, one seat on the management board
(Vorstand)70 is reserved for an employee confidant, the so-called direc-
66. MONTAN-MITBESTG § 6(2).
67. STUDIENKOMMISSION DES DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGS, UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR
REFORM DES UNTERNEHMENSRECHTS I, at 42 (1955); Aitbestimmung im Unternehm en
(Biedenkopf-report), in VI/334 BT-DRUCKSACHE 55, 89 (1970).
68. To the conflict-of-interest problems of the Arbeitsdirektor, see S. VIESEL, DER
ARBEITSDIREKTOR 21-28 (1973).
69. MitbestimmungsG of May 4, 1976, BGB1. Part I, at 1153 (in force since July 1,
1976).
70. See note 7 supra.
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tor of labor.7'
Examining the German system of employee codetermination more
closely, however, one might question the extent to which genuine em-
ployee interests are in fact represented on the supervisory board. The
law requires that a certain number of the employee representatives be
trade union representatives. Experience has shown, moreover, that the
election of the remaining representatives is generally dominated by the
trade unions as well.72 Under such a system, therefore, "employee de-
mocracy" may not fare much better than "shareholder democracy."
This conclusion is further substantiated by the fact that trade union
membership in many professions is less than fifty percent of the work
force. It cannot be taken for granted that this form of codetermination,
therefore, will effectively represent the interests of all the employees of
the enterprise in question or of the work force in general. Indeed, it is
doubtful that this product "made in Germany" is suitable for export.
A system of employee codetermination is found in a somewhat
more diminished form in other European countries as well. In Austria,
for example, one third of the seats on the supervisory board is reserved
for employee representatives; 73 the same figure is found in the EEC
coordination directive.74 The project of a societas europea, while advo-
cating full parity of shareholder and employee representatives, never-
theless adds a "third force" to the supervisory board which is more
directly affiliated with the public interest. 75 In England and other na-
tions, similar reforms are being discussed. 76
A second kind of employee codetermination requires some attention
at this point. The laws in several European nations require that impor-
tant corporate decisions having a particularly strong impact upon em-
ployee interests-such as plant closings or large scale cutbacks-be
subject to a veto by the workers' council representing the employees
within the factory. In Germany, moreover, the statute in effect from
71. Montan-MitbestimmungsG of May 21, 1951, BGB1. part I, at 347; Mitbestim-
mungs-ErganzungsG of Aug. 7, 1956, BGBI. Part I, at 707 (the two laws on codetermina-
tion in the mining and steel industry).
72. For details, see G. H. ROTH, M. LORBACHER & W. MERKEL, DIE MITBESTIMMUNG
DES ARBEITNEHMERS IN DER PRAXIS-ERGEBNISSE EINER EMPIRISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNG,
ZGR 1974, 317-42.
73. Labor Law-ArbeitsverfassungsG-of Dec. 14, 1973, BGBI. 1974/22, § 110.
74. 5th Coordination Directive of Oct. 9, 1972, Commission of European Community,
art. 4 II.
75. See note 15 supra; Statut art. 74a, 75a, b.
76. For a survey see K.O. HONDRICH, MITBESTIMMUNG IN EUROPA (1970); F.
GAMILLSCHEG, MITBESTIMMUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER, ARBEITEN ZUR RECHTSVER-
GLEICHUNG NR. 92 (1978).
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1952 to 1972 expressly required these factory councils to consider the
public interest as well.77 This latter obligation, however, proved to be
nothing but a rule without sanctions. Consequently, the new statute of
1972 dispensed with this obligation altogether. In Austria, however, a
veto by the workers' councils in matters of this kind has the effect of
bringing the matter before a governmental commission where the pub-
lic interest is also represented.78
Financial Participation
Quite a different method of guaranteeing employee participation
in the management of the corporate enterprise is being instituted on a
voluntary basis in a number of German companies:79 capital participa-
tion by the workers in the enterprise itself. This method, it is true, is
aimed primarily at goals other than employee participation in control,
viz. social reform and distribution of property. Nevertheless, it also
confers on the participating employee the normal shareholder voting
rights when the participation takes the form of stockholdings. Experi-
ence indicates, however, that employee shareholders, like small share-
holders in general, fail to exercise active control in the management of
public corporations ° and abandon their share of the power to manage-
ment or, possibly, the trade unions."' Workers' financial participation
in the enterprise, therefore, although a very important expression of
corporate social responsibility, fails to be a functional means for mak-
ing corporate social responsibility truly effective.
Direct Public Interest Representation
Independent representation of the public interest in the manage-
ment of large corporations has until now been confined to academic
discussions only. Virtually all suggestions in this area amount to pro-
posals for the participation by public interest representatives as a "third
force" on the supervisory board or on some similar body. Such a third
force would serve not only to mediate between conflicting employer
and employee interests but also to insure that the public interest is fully
considered in all corporate decisions. Parity of all three
77. BETRIEBSVERFASSUNGSG (Factory Law) of 1952, § 49(l).
78. ARBEITSVERFASSUNGSG. § 112.
79. Proposals to make this method binding on all enterprises by law are presently
under consideration in Germany and France.
80. See G. ROTH, VERMOGENSBETEILIGUNG UND MITBESTIMMUNG, BB 1977, 799.
81. Some authors and employer organizations expressed apprehension with regard to
the project of making capital participation mandatory. This project of 1974 originally fa-
vored by the German government has since disappeared from the legislative discussion.
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groups-shareholder, employee, public interest-is suggested most
often, but more complicated number games may also be found. Sev-
eral different modes of nomination are suggested. The most political
one provides for an election of the public interest representatives by
parliament.82 Other alternative modes include nomination by the gov-
ernment83 or by a governmental or quasi-governmental agency created
expressly for this purpose.8 4
A nongovernmental method for selecting the board members of
the "third force" is to leave the decision to the shareholder and em-
ployee factions.85 Under such a system, a supervisory governmental
agency would be called on to select the members only in cases where
the two factions cannot agree. This system is adopted by the draft stat-
ute of a societas europea86 which requires, in addition, that all members
of this third group be both dedicated to the public interest and in-
dependent of either the shareholder or employee factions. 87
A balanced representation of the conflicting interests within the
corporate structure, however, does not necessarily guarantee a bal-
anced decision-making process nor an efficient and competent leader-
ship. Indeed, an intricate internal decision-making process that permits
82. C. OTT, RECHT UND REALITAT DER UNTERNEHMENSKORPORATION (1977).
83. Siudienkommission des Deutschen Juristentags, Untersuchungen zur Reform des
Unternehmensrechts 1 44 (1955); see BLOCH-LAINP, POUR UNE RPFORME DE L'ENTERPRISE
(1963); H. STEINMANN, DAS GROP3UNTERNEHMEN IM INTERESSENKONFLIKT (1969).
84. H. PLANITZ, DIE STIMMRECHTSAKTIE (1922). See also ROTH, supra note 10, § 44.
All these various alternatives, however, are very similar to the old commissioner of corpora-
tions nortorious since the early times of European corporation law. The institution of the
state commissioner-a governmental supervisory officer assigned to a particular com-
pany-has been recently revived in Austria in the field of investment companies. See
Investment Company Law (InvestmentfondsG) of July 10, 1963, BGB 1. 1963 No. 192, p.
1817, art. 2 (10).
85. Another less promising approach can be found in the German environmental law
which requires every enterprise to select one employee from its ranks to serve as an "envi-
ronmental deputy." The environmental deputy's duties are twofold: first, to insure that
environmental regulations are observed and, second, to encourage the enterprise, as a matter
of general policy, to adopt measures protective of the environment. German Clean Air Law
(BundesimmissionsschutzG) of March 15, 1974, § 53. One obvious drawback of this system,
however, is that the environmental deputy lacks personal independence and any power of
his own. At least one means of achieving greater independence would be to make the recall
and dismissal of these deputies subject to special safeguards.
86. See note 13 supra, art. 74a, 75a, b.
87. It seems obvious, however, that the primary purpose of this independent third
group is to mediate between shareholder and employee interests rather than to safeguard the
public interest. The model statute, therefore, belongs more appropriately to the more lim-
ited subject of employee codetermination rather than to the larger considerations of corpo-
rate social responsibility. Nonetheless, the model represents an important first step towards
the participation of the social factor in corporate management.
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the participation of conflicting interests may, at times, even obstruct the
successful management of the enterprise.
VI. State Regulatory Powers as a Means of Implementing
Corporate Social Responsibility
If one is unwilling to entrust the enforcement of corporate social
responsibility to forces wholly within the corporation, what remains is
direct governmental intervention. Such intervention, however, would
not be limited to the enforcement of specific regulatory laws such as
those intended to protect the environment or health88 but rather would
entail a much more profound encroachment upon management's free-
dom of decision in administering the enterprise. Presently in Europe,
state regulatory powers of this nature are limited to certain specific
"sensitive areas" such as banking, public utilities, and insurance. Most
often specific governmental supervisory agencies have been established
to regulate in these areas. The question becomes, therefore, whether
this kind of pervasive state regulation is a suitable means for imple-
menting corporate social responsibility in general.
Antitrust Law and Price Regulation
Sometimes the antitrust laws offer governments some authority to
intervene to various degrees in the decision-making process of any cor-
poration in order to compel that corporation to be responsive to the
public welfare. The criterion that triggers this authority is the domina-
tion of the market by an enterprise.8 9 Under German antitrust law, for
example, the antitrust office, a federal administrative agency, may pro-
hibit enterprises dominating the market from "abusing" their posi-
tion.90 Acting on this authority, the antitrust office in 1977 succeeded
in persuading the Volkswagen Company to reduce a planned price in-
crease.91 In the European Community law, Article 86 of the EEC-
treaty92 details the cases of "abuse" and in particular prohibits the ex-
tortion of excessive prices or improper contractual conditions and the
imposition of any restriction on production, sales, or research that op-
erates to the detriment of the consumer. In Austria, cases of abuse
come under the jurisdiction of the antitrust court while the right of ac-
88. See note 2 supra.
89. KARTELLG (German Antitrust Law) § 22; AUSTRIAN KARTELLG § 40.
90. KARTELLG § 22(4)(5).
91. H.J. MERTENS, C. KIRCHNER & E. SCHANZE, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 120 (1978).
92. Of the same tenor, AUSTRIAN KARTELLG § 46.
May 1979]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tion is reserved to certain governmental agencies and employer and
employee organizations.93
By use of the various antitrust laws, therefore, some important vio-
lations of the public interest, and in particular of consumer interests,
have been subjected to state intervention. These mechanisms of the
antitrust laws, however, cannot be applied against every enterprise, or
even against every large enterprise, but only against those companies
dominating the market. Nevertheless, such companies are most prone
to an abuse of the public welfare and free market competition often
proves to be a sufficient regulator of those enterprises that do not domi-
nate the market.
Some Western European nations such as Austria 94 and France
also bestow a far-reaching authority of price regulation in private com-
merce upon their governments. In Austria, for example, the secretary
of state, under certain conditions, may fix a particular price as "eco-
nomically legitimate" when an enterprise dominating the market raises
its prices excessively. 95
The Limited Value of State Regulation
The antitrust laws described above amply demonstrate that, at
least in principle, state regulatory powers can be useful for implement-
ing corporate social responsibility. Such direct regulation by the state,
however, is not universally applicable. First, because of the principles
of the constitutional state, any kind of state intervention must be lim-
ited to clearly defined cases. Thus, a general provision empowering a
governmental agency to interdict wholly at its own discretion any en-
trepreneurial action that it perceives to be detrimental to the public
interest, or, for that matter, to command such actions on behalf on the
public interest, is unacceptable. Second, such a policy would presage
the end of free and private enterprise, at least on the level of the large
enterprise. It is, therefore, for good reason that the antitrust laws per-
mit state intervention only when the very mechanisms of private and
autonomous bargaining have been repudiated. Third, it is hard to im-
agine that a comprehensive state regulation of all economic activities
potentially relevant to the public welfare would operate effectively. Ex-
periences with price control indicate the difficulties inherent in any sys-
tem or pervasive state regulation, and price control is a trifle compared
93. AUSTRIAN KARTELLG §§ 46, 94.
94. PREISGESETZ (Pricing Law) of May 19, 1976, BGB1. 1976/260.
95. PREIsG § 3(1). In addition, German and Austrian antitrust law gives some protec-
tion to small firms dependent on the dominating firms. See, e.g., id.
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to a task of such Orwellian dimensions. 96
VI. Indirect Regulation as a Means of Implementing
Corporate Social Responsibility
Jawboning and Other Governmental Activities
The practice commonly called "jawboning" in the United States
whereby the government persuades corporations by indirect and extra-
legal means to behave in a particular fashion is also well known in
Europe. Under such a practice, when corporate managements fails to
be impressed with the government's arguments, stronger medicine is at
hand: the government may go public and publicize the corporation's
inauspicious actions or it may threaten to withhold certain benefits
such as government contracts from the intransigent enterprise. 97
Jawboning is often used to prevent price increases or to regulate affairs
relevant to foreign politics or matters of general national concern. The
record of jawboning is mixed and the practice is appropriately limited
to particularly important cases only. One important example of this
kind of institutionalized moral persuasion is the "concerted action"
(KonzertierteAktion) established by German law in 1968. It is a round
table meeting of government representatives, the federal bank, aca-
demic consultants, and employer and employee organizations which,
by means of appeal and persuasion only, attempts to keep the industry
as well as other economic groups in line with the economic policies of
the government.
Industrial Self-Policing
In certain areas industrial self-policing operates even more infor-
mally than the "concerted action" method mentioned above. This
more informal method is sometimes favored by administrative agen-
cies, the government and other political forces, and its very purpose
most often is to prevent a legislative or administrative intervention. In
1971, for example, German tobacco manufacturers agreed among
themselves to restrict their advertising of cigarettes for the protection of
the public health in general and of youth in particular.98 Another ex-
ample of this more informal method is the employer organizations that,
96. One fufiher consideration in this area is the special problem posed by multinational
corporations whose decisions and actions are not localized in any one nation.
97. H.J. MERTENS, C. KIRCHNER & E. SCHANZE, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 145 (1978). For
the practice of the Belgian banking commission, see DABIN, LE CONTROLE DES HOLDINGS
EN DROIT BELGE 270 (1977).,
98. See D. BAAS, supra note 11, at 191 & passim.
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in order to fight juvenile unemployment, promise to create a certain
number of new training jobs. Another example from German industry
is the guidelines against insider trading promulgated as a code of con-
duct for companies and their managers in order to prevent the abuses
of insider trading.99
Industrial self-policing is potentially an effective means for imple-
menting corporate social responsibility. Peer pressure by those enter-
prises favoring greater corporate social responsibility can achieve more
effective results than governmental influence. Having convinced their
competitors of the need for more social responsibility, these peers are
free to realize their good intentions without apprehending competitive
disadvantages. Experience indicates, however, that in practice self-po-
licing suffers from half-heartedness in substance and tends rather to
serve as a "moral fig-leaf' than to solve the real problems.
VIII. State Capitalism
State Ownership in Private Companies
The least complicated way for the state to influence the corpora-
tion is to acquire meaningful stockholdings in the corporation. The
state may then completely control the enterprise by means of corpora-
tion law. This approach might result in the optimal implementation of
corporate social responsibility if three conditions are met. First, the
government agent responsible for administering the government's
stockholdings must be optimally qualified to safeguard the public inter-
est. Second, the law itself must permit a shareholder to demand that
management pursue a course of action most beneficial to the public
welfare even when such action may prove detrimental to the best inter-
ests of other private shareholders and competitors. Third, the state,
when acting as a shareholder, must in fact give priority to these inter-
ests. As European experience amply demonstrates, however, all three
conditions are not easily satisfied.
State capital holdings in private companies are of great impor-
tance in nearly all European countries. Many private corporations are
entirely or partly owned by the state.100 The state owns, for example,
99. Empfehlungen der Bbrsensachverstaindigenkommission beim Bundes- wirtschaft-
sministerium of Nov. 13, 1970.
100. In addition to its holdings in private corporations, the state also owns enterprises
for the purpose of administering certain public services such as the postal service, telephone
and telegraph, and public transport (including the national railway systems). In such enter-
prises, however, the public interest prevails from the beginning, even if aspects of profitabil-
ity cannot entirely be neglected for fiscal reasons.
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100% of the stock in the Italian Alfa Romeo company and the French
Renault company; in the German Volkswagenwerk corporation, the
state is a co-owner of 40%. In total, the share of the state's holdings in
private enterprise is estimated at more than one third in Italy' 0 and
France. More exact statistics are available for Austria. As a conse-
quence of the nationalization of the basic industries and the banking
business after World War 11,102 the Austrian state participates to the
extent of more than one quarter in the industrial net production. 0 3
The share of state-owned companies in the nominal gross national
product amounts to nineteen percent. The figures are exceptionally
high in the fields of public utilities (78.5%) and banking and insurance
(70.8%). A similar picture emerges from the employment figures: state-
controlled business and industry excluding employees in the public sec-
tor account for 400,000 employees, equivalent to eighteen percent of
the entire working force.
The State-owned Company
By owning 100% of an enterprise, the state, in administering the
corporation, is free to pursue the public interest at the expense of profit
maximization. It is difficult to judge, however, to what extent the state
does sacrifice profits for the public welfare. Most cases to come to light
in this area involved the situations where state enterprises refuse to en-
force needed cutbacks or restrictions on production in order to preserve
jobs. In Germany, for example, a state-owned steel plant did not take
part in a general price increase put into effect by other enterprises. Ital-
ian state-owned enterprises in particular are known for investing in un-
derdeveloped regions for social and political reasons. Economic losses
resulting from such decisions are deliberately taken into the bargain.
On the other hand, state-owned enterprises have also incurred consid-
erable losses without any obvious compensation in benefits to the
public.
In fields other than those already mentioned, state-owned enter-
prises are not particularly known for a marked sense of social responsi-
101. See DIE ZEIT, June 30, 1978, at 19.
102. Subject to nationalization were, among others, 100% of the iron ore industry, 100%
of the pig-iron industry, 95% of the crude-steel industry, 91% of brown coal mining, 70% of
the aliminum production, 85% of the energy sector and the three largest banks. But see
Nemschak, in GEMEINWIRTSCHAFT IN OSTERREICH 24 (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der dster-
reichischen Gemeinwirtschaft, ed. 1972).
103. 26.3%. Statistics taken from R. Griinwald, Die verstaatlichte Industrie Osterrechs,
in DIE GEMEINWIRTSCHAFT IN OSTERREICH 190-225; STATISTISCHES HANDBUCH DER
REPUBLIK OSTERREICH 1975.
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bility. Cars from state-owned factories, for example, are not any safer
than those produced by privately owned factories. State-owned facto-
ries contribute their share to polluting the environment.
Other motives for state acquisition of private enterprise exist. The
most frequent reason, at least in recent times, for state acquisition of
private enterprise is job preservation: the enterprise is close to bank-
ruptcy and the state intervenes in order to preserve jobs. Thus, once
again the goal of securing employment prevails. Some other less com-
mon reasons may be found as well: the original owner may have been
dispossessed for political reasons; an enterprise may be taken over for
its military potential or to prevent foreign control. At any rate, no signs
of a single-minded governmental investment policy for the purpose of
serving the public interest can be found. The preeminence of the pub-
lic interest, it is true, was often used as an argument when the nationali-
zation of certain enterprises was effectuated. The realities of
nationalization, however, more often give the impression that the un-
derlying reason for such action was not so much social responsibility
but rather the acquisition of key positions of economic power such as
commercial banks, and the steel industry. Finally, some legal as well
as economic reservations to the state-owned company's policy of sub-
jecting profitability to other goals have to be noted. If, for example, the
steel industry needs price increases for valid economic reasons, and if
the state-owned plant, being in a position to bear the resulting losses
more easily, does not join in the rise, the private competitors are dam-
aged-with the anti-trust law consequences already looming-and the
steering mechanisms of the national economy jeopardized.
State vs. Private Shareholders
When the state is not the sole stockholder of the corporation, it
becomes less clear whether the state is free to neglect the profit interests
of its private co-shareholders' ° in order to pursue some public interest.
The manner in which the German secretary of economics handled the
1962 Volkswagenwerk incident may shed some light in this area. The
Volkswagenwerk corporation planned a price increase which was con-
trary to government economic policy. The secretary, however, neither
made use of the large state stockholdings in the corporation, nor inter-
vened in the decision-making process through the state representatives
on the board, but rather resorted to jawboning. 0 5 One might even sub-
104. But see M. LUTrER, ZUR TREUEPFLICHT DES GRO3AKTIONARS, JZ 1976, 226.
105. The Secretary, however, failed to convince the Volkswagenwerk Corporation to
refrain from raising their prices.
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ject jawboning to restrictions when the state has holdings in the enter-
prise. Otherwise, the management of the company may feel obliged to
comply despite strong reasons to the contrary.
VIII. Conclusions
The foregoing analysis of various European models in the field of
corporate social responsiblity supports the following conclusions:
(1) As a general principle, corporate social responsibility ought
to be recognized in most European countries although not always ex-
pressly adopted in the codes. The problem faced in most European
countries is how to make this general principle effective in any particu-
lar case.
(2) To the extent that corporate social responsibility lends itself
to particularization in specific legal provisions such as environmental
law, worker protection laws, or products liability statutes, the various
European models indicate that the legislature should remain active.
The implementation of such specific provisions will then be mainly the
task of administrative agencies.
(3) On the other hand, state regulatory powers, or even state cap-
italism, are not the panacea to all problems in the area of corporate
social responsiblity. Only in particularly sensitive areas may the ad-
vantages of such massive governmental interference potentially out-
weigh the .inherent menace to our economic system posed by such
governmental action.
(4) The foregoing analysis indicates that the most promising
method of making corporate social responsibility effective is by means
of an elaborate combination of internal corporate mechanisms with ex-
ternal mechanisms more subtle than state interference. Internally, the
corporation's managing body must be constituted so as to insure a bal-
anced evaluation of the conflicting interests of the shareholders, em-
ployees, and the general public. External stimuli may prove to
motivate the decisionmakers accordingly.
(5) The internal approach pursued in some European countries is
aimed at the direct representation of all interests-shareholders, em-
ployees, and the general public-within the corporate power structure
(the "pluralistic principle"). It is submitted, however, that a much bet-
ter approach would be to make management the trustee of all interests
involved. Such a system would entail a conflict-of-interest-free super-
visory body established on a supra-management level (the "principle of
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responsibility and control").
(6) As for the external stimuli, corporate social responsibility
may be most effectively realized through the pressure exerted by public
opinion. In order to achieve this, increased disclosures of corporate
actions and increased attention by the mass media and the public at
large to the actions of corporations are needed. A system of social ac-
counting seems to be the most promising instrument by which to realize
these goals.
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